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On 20 May 2020, Philipp Dann, Michael Riegner and Lena Zagst presented on this
blog the complaint before the European Court of Auditors (CoA), which a group of
NGOs led by the Global Legal Action Network (GLAN) submitted about a month
ago. The authors had provided an expert opinion to the complaint, claiming that the
EU’s “Libya Programme” violated EU budget and constitutional law. The authors
argue that the EU’s financial support to the Libyan authorities is wrongful, as it is
not sufficiently linked to the objective of ‘development’ and thus lacks a basis in
EU budget law, and because the EU failed to fulfil its human rights due diligence
(HRDD) obligations.
We want to add to the post by assessing the complaint in its broader context: Firstly,
by focussing on the HRDD obligations under EU Law, followed by looking “beyond”
EU Law to assess the EU’s responsibility under general international law. Lastly, we
assess the (dis-)advantages of this rather alternative means of litigation
Background of the complaint
It is not the first time that the dire human rights situation in Libya was brought to
the attention of an international judicial body (cf. the situation referred to the ICC by
the United Nations Security Council). The same is true for the European practice
of deterrence, preventing migrants and refugees to enter the EU as early on their
journey as possible (examples are the by now seminal case of Hirsi Jamaa and
Others v. Italy, and the pending S.S. and Others v. Italy, both before the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)). However, this is the first complaint that seeks to
reprehend the European border security management by asserting the unlawfulness
of the financial support provided by the European Commission through the backdoor
of EU budget law via the CoA.
The CoA is the EU’s professional external investigatory audit agency (cf. Art. 285 f.
TFEU) and it supervises how the EU organs spend the funds allocated to them by
the member states. Although it cannot annul financial decisions, an audit into the
Libya Programme would lead to notable political pressure on the EU Commission.
To understand the complaint, let us briefly recall the outline of the Libya Programme,
which was developed under the ‘European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability
and Addressing Root causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in
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Africa’ (EUTFA). The EUTFA was created in 2015 as a consequence of the rising
numbers of migrants seeking refuge in the EU and is mainly funded by the European
Development Fund. The Libya Programme (cf. action fiche phase one and two)
utilizes those funds to support the Libyan border control agencies in their effort to
deter refugees and migrants on the Mediterranean Sea and return them to Libya.
Human rights due diligence
In focusing on the EU’s failure to comply with its obligation to exercise HRDD in its
external actions, the complaint adds to a topical discussion around the scope and
content of HRDD. The concept of due diligence is well established in environmental
law and on the rise in international law generally (and it’s academic assessment, in
the words of Anne Peters, “couldn´t be more timely”). In the context of human rights,
due diligence refers to the standard of care that a state must meet to avoid human
rights violations, especially those committed by other actors, such as businesses or
third states.
HRDD is generally defined as a procedural obligation consisting of a human rights
impact assessment, as well as adequate measures to mitigate and remedy the risks.
The duty bearer has to gather information about the actual or potential impacts their
activities have. The assessment must consist of actively investigating the situation
at hand, not only addressing already existing knowledge; and should involve all
stakeholders. The impact assessment is followed by mitigation measures aiming at
the prevention of potential future violations; and remediating occurring violations.
In this sense, HRDD is an ongoing, continuous process. The scope of the impact
assessment and the concrete nature and intensity of necessary mitigation and
remedial measures will vary and have to be determined on a case by case basis.
As laid out by Dann, Riegner and Zagst, the EU has to comply with these HRDD
obligations in its external actions as well, including any cooperation revolving
around border control and refugee/migration management. This obligation arises
from EU constitutional law: Different from the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR), the EU Charta of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR) does not contain a
restrictive jurisdiction clause. Its Art. 51 (1) states that the provisions of the Charta
applies when EU institutions implement Union law, which is the case in the Libya
programme. A systematic reading of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) support the applicability
of human rights in the EU’s external actions (cf. Art. 3 (5), Art. 21 (1) (3) TEU; Art.
208, 214 TFEU). Both treaties emphasize that external actions should be guided by
and adhere to the protection of human rights and international law. Lastly, secondary
EU Law relating to development policies and external actions mirror this human
rights obligations, for this case most notable the regulation governing the EDF (cf.
Art. 2 (5) (b) Regulation 2015/322).
What adequate HRDD in external actions looks like depends widely on the control
the EU has in the relevant programme, as well as the degree of knowledge,
foreseeability, likelihood and severity of human rights risks. One factor to consider
is that HRDD is most prominently discussed as a standard of conduct for non-state
actors or for states in relation to non-state actors, such as corporations and private
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actors who cannot be held directly accountable under international law. Libya as a
state, however, is responsible for human rights violations attributable to it. Its status
as an accountable subject of international law must have implications on the EU’s
human rights obligations, at least to some extent. However, it is our argument that,
while the EU can generally trust that other states do not violate their human rights
obligations, it cannot rely on this presumption when credible allegations of human
rights violations arise.
In the case of Libya, there is no way the EU was not aware of the severe human
rights abuses refugees and migrants face(d) in Libya, latest when the second
phase of the Libya program was approved. Further, the alleged and documented
violations were egregious, including violations of the ius cogens prohibition of torture,
and the likelihood of the violations to continue was very high. Therefore, the EU
did not only have an obligation to exercise a minimum level of due diligence, but
not to cooperate with Libyan authorities, especially not to finance their inhumane
“migration management”. HRDD, although generally a procedural obligation, can in
our opinion condense and give effect to an obligation not to engage, if there is no
way of effectively mitigating the risk of contributing to human rights violations. Similar
provisions can be found in the UN’s HRDD policies when engaging with non-UN
security forces, if high and grave human rights risks cannot be mitigated (see here).
Altogether, the only adequate result after exercising HRDD in the case of the Libya
program would have been not to support the inhumane migration policies of Libyan
actors at all.
General international law
Having established that the EU should not have supported the Libyan actors, what
do we make of the fact that it did nevertheless? We approach this question of the
EU’s responsibility from an international legal perspective adding to the previous
post’s focus on EU law.
First, as mentioned, Libyan actors have been deemed responsible for serious
violations of international human rights law: The ECtHR, e.g., considered the regime
to be in violation of the prohibition of torture, part of customary international law, as
well as enshrined in Art. 7 ICCPR and the Convention against Torture, both of which
Libya is a party to (cf. case of Hirsi Jamaa et. al. v. Italy, paras 125 et seq.).
While the EU itself is not a party to the relevant human rights treaties, it is still bound
by the customary status of these rules (cf. ECJ, Case C-366/10, at para. 101). By
financing the Libyan coastguard, the EU assists Libya continuing its’s internationally
wrongful practices. Analogously to the responsibility of accomplice states (cf. Art. 16
of the Articles on State Responsibility), international organization are responsible for
aiding or assisting a state in the commission of an internationally wrongful act (cf.
Art. 14 of the Articles on the responsibility of international organizations).
As to international criminal law, the ICC is investigating into the situation in Libya
to determine individual criminal liability for crimes against humanity (from 15
February 2011 onwards). According to the ICC Prosecutor herself, her office is also
investigating “serious and widespread crimes against migrants” transiting through
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Libya. As argued here, the investigation could also cover the investigation of the
involvement of European Agents in colluding with Libyan actors and assisting in the
establishment and maintenance of a system that has produced such crimes.
Conclusions and outlook
Altogether, the EU practice seems to be wrongful from more than one perspective.
Why is it then that the complaint is brought before the CoA, which will focus (only) on
the budgetary implications and will not hand down a binding judgment (cf. Art. 285 f.
TFEU)?
Firstly, despite the complaint’s weak legal power (CoA findings are not binding), its
strength lies in the exploration of an innovative and creative approach of holding the
EU accountable for “financial complicity”, which, notably, is backed up by the expert
opinion and is based on convincing factual research and legal reasoning. It adds
to the already existing approaches and discussion, which will put further pressure
on the EU. In this regard, the complaint must not be seen as an alternative to the
existing litigation efforts, but as a supplement. Further, the complaint has the chance
to hold the EU accountable as a whole (as it is not merely directed against member
states) by tackling the EU’s involvement at its root, namely the funding.
Regardless of the outcome of the complaint, the EU has yet to develop a way to
address migration that complies with its human rights obligations. The approaches
of rejecting migrants at its frontiers or supporting the “bouncers” have proven
ineffective, inhumane and therefore wrongful. In its self-perception, the EU is a
pioneer of peace, reflected in Art. 2 of its founding treaty: “The Union is founded on
the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of
law and respect for human rights (…)”. Through outsourcing the illegal containment
and deterrence of refugees and migrants, the EU cannot evade responsibility for
violating its own human rights obligations and values. Conversely, it must exercise
adequate HRDD in its external actions. As we have argued for the case of the Libya
program, this might amount to an obligation not to engage.
It is now up to the guardian of the EU’s finances to investigate the legal and
budgetary implications of the EU’s involvement in serious human rights abuses
and to decide whether the EU lived up to its obligations – the decision may be well
considered, but declaring the EU practice as legitimate seems hardly justifiable from
a legal point of view.
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